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George: Search and Seizure - Fourth Amendment Protection and the Expectat

SEARCH AND SEIZURE-Fourth Amendment Protection and
the Expectation of Privacy in the Home of Another: When is
a Guest Really not a Guest? Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83
(1998).
INTRODUCTION

Based on a tip from an informant who had walked by a ground-floor
apartment and saw the occupants bagging white powder, Jim Thielen, an
Eagan, Minnesota, police officer, went to the apartment complex.' Once
there, in order to get close enough to view the activities inside, he left the
common sidewalk, crossed over the lawn, climbed behind some bushes and
situated himself approximately twelve-to-eighteen inches from the window
Thielen observed the packaging for several minutes by looking through a
gap in a closed Venetian blind? He then left to contact4 police headquarters
so that affidavits for a search warrant could be prepared.
The three people inside were Wayne Thomas Carter, Melvin Johns,
and the apartment's lessee, Kimberly Thompson.' When Carter and Johns
left the apartment they got into a Cadillac that was later stopped by Eagan
police officers.6 The officers had been instructed to stop the Cadillac if the
suspects tried to drive away.7 The police ordered both Carter and Johns to
get out of the vehicle., When one officer opened the door to let Johns exit,
he saw a black zippered pouch and a handgun on the floor.' The officers
arrested Carter and Johns." The next day, after receiving a signed search
warrant, the officers searched the vehicle." Inside the police discovered a
scale, pagers, and forty-seven grams of cocaine contained in plastic
baggies.'2
A subsequent search of the apartment, pursuant to a warrant, revealed
cocaine residue on the kitchen table." The officers also found baggies that
were like the ones seized from the Cadillac." Thielen identified Carter as
the person placing the white mixture on the table and putting it in piles,
1. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 85 (1998).
2. Minnesota v.Carter, 569 N.W.2d 169,171 (Minn. 1997).
3. Carter,525 U.S. at 85.
4. Id.
5. Carter,569 N.W.2d at 172.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
II.Id.
12. Id.
13. Carter,525 U.S. at 86.
14. Id.
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Johns as the person placing the powder into baggies, and Thompson as the
person cutting the ends off the baggies and putting them into piles.'" The
police later learned that Carter and Johns lived in Chicago and came to
Thompson's apartment for the sole purpose of bagging the cocaine. The
two had never been to the apartment before, and they were there for only
two and one-half hours. 6
The State charged Carter and Johns with conspiracy to commit controlled substance crime in the first degree and aiding and abetting in a controlled substance crime in the first degree.'7 The two moved to suppress the
evidence obtained from the car and apartment and to suppress incriminating
statements made after arrest." They contended that Officer Thielen's initial
observation of them bagging the cocaine was an unreasonable and warrantless search that violated their Fourth Amendment rights.' 9 Therefore, the
evidence was inadmissible as "fruit of the poisonous tree."2, The Minnesota
trial court denied the motion to suppress and both Carter and Johns were
convicted of state drug offenses." The Minnesota Appeals Court affirmed
the convictions in separate appeals.2 A divided Minnesota Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the two had "legitimate expectations of privacy in the
invaded place.",

15. Carter,569 N.W.2d at 173.
16. Carter,525 U.S. at 86.
17. Id. at 86.
18. Id. See Respondent's Brief at 4, Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U. S. 83 (1998) (No. 97-1147), Carter
made a statement to the police in which he admitted ownership of a duffel bag found inside the Cadillac.
Id. A search of the duffel bag uncovered a digital gram scale containing traces and residue of cocaine.
Id. Johns made a statement to the police admitting he had accepted a proposal to transport cocaine from
Illinois to Minnesota for money, and that he, Carter, and Thompson had packaged the cocaine at Thompson's apartment. Id. He also admitted that there were approximately two ounces of crack cocaine and a
handgun in the vehicle. Id.
19. Carter,525 U.S. at 86.
20. Id. See Michael Pills, Investigation and Police Practices, 86 GEO. L.J. 1339, 1339 (1998).
Evidence obtained through violations of the Fourth Amendment cannot be introduced by the prosecution
at trial due to the exclusionary rule. Id. If admitted, reversal is necessary unless error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The Fourth Amendment is generally asserted by criminals in motions to
suppress evidence. id. Courts are reluctant to strictly enforce Fourth Amendment violations because of
the societal costs of letting criminals escape punishment through the exclusionary rule. Id. Judges are
loathe to suppress evidence especially when serious crimes are involved and will uphold questionable
police conduct in order to admit important evidence. Id. See L. Timothy Perrin, et al., If It 's not Broken,
Fix It: Moving Beyond the Exclusionary Rule, 83 IOWA L. REV. 669, 671-74 (1998). The exclusionary
rule allows criminals to return to society either through non-prosecution or non-conviction because
evidence has been suppressed. Id. Criticism of the rule and its high societal costs have resulted in the
Supreme Court carving out exceptions leaving the rule battered and eroded. Id. It remains, however, the
central remedy to deter police misconduct. Id. The rule's erosion diminishes all people's rights. Id.
When courts legitimize questionable or illegal police conduct they limit protections guaranteed under the
Fourth Amendment. Id. It is ironical that when courts do this they are tightening the scope of Constitutional rights while attempting to elude the rule the Supreme Court made to protect these same rights. Id.
21. Carter,525 U.S. at 86.
22. Id. at 87.
23. Id.
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In making its decision, the United States Supreme Court had to consider an important question: Did Thielen's peering into Thompson's apartment constitute an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment?"
The Court reversed the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision.,' It held that
in order to claim Fourth Amendment protection, "a defendant must demonstrate that he personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched,
and that his expectation is reasonable."26 The Supreme Court found that
Carter and Johns had no legitimate expectation of privacy in Thompson's
apartment."
This case note explores the development of the Supreme Court's approach to the issue of the expectation of privacy when one is in the home or
dwelling of another, and whether this gives rise to protection under the
Fourth Amendment. It also examines the weaknesses of the Carter opinion
and discuss its implications for future Fourth Amendment cases.
BACKGROUND

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees,
"the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches .... "2' The Amendment gives the
judiciary the power to protect a person's freedom and privacy from governmental intrusion.2' The language of the Fourth Amendment is broadly
stated creating interpretive challenges. 0 Courts must balance the interests
of the individual against those of the government." Application of the
Fourth Amendment has not been easy and there has been a continuing evolution of its jurisprudence over the last thirty years.' 2 The Supreme Court
has often issued vague rules and varying doctrines regarding the Fourth
3
Amendment because the concept of privacy is open to diverse definitions.
Reasonable Expectations of Privacy
The Supreme Court's recent approach suggests a narrowing of the
range of protected privacy rights and an increase in its deference to the gov-

24. Donald Dripps, Visiting Drug Dealers, Peeping Toms, and the FourthAmendment, 34 JOURNAL
OF THE ASS'N OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF AMERICA, 86, 86 (1998).

25. Carter,525 U.S. at91.
26. Id. at 88.
27. Id. at 91.
28. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
29. Gerald Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and the Legitimate Expectation of Privacy, 34 VAND.
L. REV. 1289, 1290 (1981).
30. Id. at 1290.
31. Id.
32. J. Richard Broughton, "Business Curtilage" and the Fourth Amendment: Reconciling Katz with
the Common Law, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 513, 514 (1998).
33

Id
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ernment to gather evidence.34 For example, the Court found that a homeowner had no expectation of privacy in his trash left at the curb of his
house;35 the Court has allowed aerial surveillance of private residence backyards;16 and the Court allowed government officials to determine phone

numbers dialed from home phones."
Fourth Amendment analysis centers around the notion of "a reason-

able expectation of privacy.",,

The Amendment addresses only two is-

sues-searches and seizures." What constitutes a search is based on reasonable expectations of privacy in the place of the search or the property

seized.10 If an item is in plain view, even if it is in a home or office, it is not

protected by the Fourth Amendment. '' ' However, what a person attempts to

preserve as private, even if accessible to the public, may be afforded Fourth
Amendment protection.12 When analyzing a Fourth Amendment issue, it
must be established whether or not4 the party had a reasonable expectation of
privacy that was encroached upon.

1

Expectations of Privacy in the Home

Rarely has it been an issue whether a homeowner has an expectation of
privacy in his own home. The Supreme Court, since the enactment of the
Fourth Amendment, has recognized "the overriding respect for the sanctity
of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the

34. Jana Nestlerode, Re-"Righting" the Right to Privacy: The Supreme Court and the Constitutional
Right to Privacy in CriminalLaw, 41 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 59, 101 (1993).

35. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988). The Supreme Court concluded that,
"respondents exposed their garbage to the public sufficiently to defeat their claim to Fourth Amendment
protection. It is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street are
readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public." Id.
However, the Justices found it irrelevant that a city ordinance prohibited Greenwood from disposing of
his garbage in any other way than leaving it on the curb for the city trash collectors. Id.
36. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986). The Supreme Court held that the warrantless observation of a backyard within the curtilage of the home was not unreasonable. Id. The Court
reasoned that, "in an age where private and commercial flight in the public airways is routine, it is unreasonable for respondent to expect that his marijuana plants were constitutionally protected from being
observed with the naked eye from an altitude of 1,000 feet. Id. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 45051 (1989). The defendant moved to suppress evidence, seized marijuana plants, based on aerial observations by police in a helicopter 400 feet above his greenhouse. Id. The Court held that the defendant
could not "reasonably have expected that his greenhouse was protected from public or official observation from a helicopter had it been flying within the navigable airspace for fixed-wing aircraft." Id. In
United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976), the defendants moved to suppress heroin and marked
money seized by the police at the time of arrest. The Court held that while the defendant was standing in
the dooorway of her house, this was a public place, and she was not in an area where she had any expectation of privacy. Id.
37. United States v. Merriwether, 917 F.2d 955, 958-59 (6th Cir. 1990).
38. Stephen Jones, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy: Searches, Seizures, and the Concept of
FourthAmendment Standing, 27 U. MEM. L. REv. 907,908 (1997).

39. Id. at 925.
40. Id. at 934.
41. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967).
42. Id.

43. Jones, supra note 38, at 908.
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Republic."' This concept is also embedded in the text of the Amendment:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects .... "
Historically, the Fourth Amendment protected real and personal property rights from arbitrary searches and seizures, which was a great concern
in the eighteenth century." From the eighteenth century to the latter part of
the twentieth century the Court's analysis of the Fourth Amendment focused primarily on property rights." This changed with the Court's landmark decision in Katz v. United States." In Katz, the Court rejected property-based theories and shifted to privacy as the principle upon which
Fourth Amendment protection was premised. 9
The petitioner in Katz was charged with gambling by sending betting
information by phone to Miami and Boston from Los Angeles, violating a
federal statute." The government introduced evidence obtained by FBI
agents who had attached an electronic listening and recording device to the
outside of a public telephone booth." The Court held that the government's
activities violated the privacy upon which the petitioner relied while using
12
the phone, constituting a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
Justice Harlan, in a concurring opinion in Katz, articulated a two-part
test as to when Fourth Amendment protection would be given." First, a
person has to have a subjective expectation of privacy in the invaded place,
and second, society needs to recognize that expectation as reasonable.5 ' If
either prong of the test is not met, there is no Fourth Amendment issue nor
an improper search or seizure." Since Katz, the Fourth Amendment is no
longer limited to protection from physical trespass, but extends to all areas
6
where an individual could reasonably expect privacy. '

44. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984).
45. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

46. This concern was based on the colonists' experience with writs of assistance and their memories
of general warrants that were used in England. Writs of assistance allowed local sheriffs to forcibly
enter colonist's homes to search for smuggled goods. General warrants allowed officials in England to

forcibly enter homes and search for seditious publications. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 5.03 at 69-70 (2nd ed. 1997)_
47. Id.
48. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
49. Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property,Privacy, or Security?

33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 320 (1998).
50. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J. concurring).
51. Id.

52. Id. at 358.
53. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J. concurring).
54. Id.
55. Walter M. Hudson, A Few New Developments in the Fourth Amendment, 1999 ARMY LAWYER

25, 25 (1999).
56. See DRESSLER, supra note 46, § 7.02 at 84-85. Fourth Amendment analysis is divided into two
historical periods. The first ended in 1967 with the Court's decision in Katz. Prior to Katz, based on the
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Nearly forty years ago in Jones v. United States, the Court determined
whether the Fourth Amendment rights of a defendant had been violated
when federal officers (who had a warrant) searched the apartment to which
he had access." The officers found and seized narcotics and narcotics paraphemalia." The defendant had clothing in the apartment, had stayed there

for a night, and had a key to the apartment, but he lived elsewhere." The
defendant moved for the district court to suppress the evidence as it was the
product of an illegal search."0 He contended that the warrant was issued
without a showing of probable cause.6 ' The government disputed his
standing to make this motion. The District Court and the Court of Appeals

found he did not have standing to raise the legality of the search because he
was merely a guest of the apartment owner."
The Supreme Court held that the search of the apartment violated the
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.'3 The Court reasoned that because

the accused had a legal right to be in the apartment, he had standing to raise
the question of an improper search.

The Court stated that "anyone 'legiti-

''
mately on the premises' where a search occurs may challenge its legality."

The Court rejected the "legitimately on the premises" doctrine of Jones
in its 1978 decision in Rakas v. Illinois." The Court concluded that "legitimately on the premises" was too broad a measurement for Fourth Amend7
The petitioners in Rakas were convicted of armed robbery."
ment rightsY.
At trial, the prosecution submitted evidence that the police had seized when
they searched the automobile in which the petitioners had been passengers.6

Court's decision in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), the Fourth Amendment did not apply
unless there was a physical intrusion or trespass into a constitutionally protected are. Id. See also,
Bradley W. Foster, WarrantlessAerial Surveillance and the Right to Privacy: The Flight of the Fourth
Amendment, 56 J. AIR. L. & COM. 719, 727 (1991) (Fourth Amendment protection extended to all areas
where a person has an expectation of privacy).
57. 362 U.S. 257, 259 (1960).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 259-60.
63. Id. at 265.
64. Id. at 267.
65. Id.
66. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
67. Id. at 141-142. The Court stated:
[fqor example, applied literally this statement [legitimately on the premises] would
permit a casual visitor who has never seen, or been permitted to visit, the basement
of another's house to object to a search of the basement if the visitor happened to be
in the kitchen of the house at the time of the search. Likewise, a casual visitor who
walks into a house one minute before a search of the house commences and leaves
one minute after the search ends would be able to contest the legality of the search."
Id.
68. Id. at 129.
69. Id
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Neither petitioner owned the automobile nor asserted ownership of the
seized articles. 70 On appeal, the Court denied their motion to suppress the
evidence because of an unlawful search and seizure.' The Court concluded
that a person needing only to be "legitimately on the premises" in order to
challenge the validity of the search of a dwelling could not be taken beyond
the facts of the Jones case.""
Justice White, in dissent, took the view that if "legitimately on the
premises" was rejected, a bright line test to measure Fourth Amendment
rights was foregone for a less certain analysis based on whether the facts
presented gave rise to a legitimate expectation of privacy.3 The majority
rejected this by stating that the phrase, "'legitimately on the premises' has
not been shown to be an easily applicable measure of Fourth Amendment
rights" so much as it has proved to be simply a label placed by the courts on
results which have not been subjected to careful analysis."'
The most recent case in which the Supreme Court looked into the expectation of privacy of a person in the home of another was Minnesota v.
Olson. The Court held that Olson's arrest violated his Fourth Amendment
rights because it was made after a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into
a residence where he was an overnight guest."6 Olson assisted in the armed
robbery of a Minnesota Amoco gas station by driving the getaway car."
The police received information that he was staying in the upper unit of a
duplex that was the residence of two women." Police surrounded the unit,
called one of the women, and told her to send the suspect out.? They heard
a male voice say, "tell them I left," at which point the officers entered the
residence without permission and arrested Olson. 0
The Court concluded that his status as a guest gave him a legitimate
expectation of privacy in his host's home." The Court reasoned that staying
overnight with others is a social custom that is recognized as valuable in our

70. Id.

71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 156 (1978) (White, J., dissenting).
74. Lower court decisions have applied the bright line test with varying results. See Holloway v.
Wolff, 482 F.2d 110, 112 (Cal. 1973)(holding that defendant had standing to object to search of a third
person's bedroom because he was in the bedroom at the time of the search even though he did not show
that he had permission to be in the bedroom or had ever been in the bedroom before); Northen v. United
States, 455 F.2d 427, 430 (Cal. 1972)(holding that defendant did not have standing to object to a search
of a roommate's bedroom because he could not show he had permission to enter the bedroom, even
though he was in the apartment at the time of the search).
75. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 146-47.
76. 495 U.S. at 93.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. d. at 94.
80. Id.
RI.

Id. at 9g.
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society. 2 The Court held that, "although we may spend all day in public
places, when we cannot sleep in our own home we seek out another private
place to sleep, whether it be a hotel room, or the home of a friend. 3 Society
expects at least as much privacy in these places as in a telephone booth...
expectations of freedom from intrusion are recognized as reasonable."" The
Court found that if an overnight guest is in a home with permission, and the
host is willing to share his house and privacy with the guest, then the guest
has a legitimate expectation of privacy.'
PRINCIPAL CASE

The Supreme Court reversed the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision
in an opinion delivered by Chief Justice Rehnquist.1 The Court found that
the Minnesota Supreme Court's analysis of privacy under the doctrine of
standing was inappropriate. 7 The Court had expressly rejected that doctrine
in Rakas over twenty years ago." In Rakas, the defendant could not show
that his rights, rather than those of another, were violated." The Court
stated that, the "definition of those rights is more properly placed within the
purview of substantive Fourth Amendment law than within that of standing."' The Court found that, "a defendant must demonstrate that he personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that his expectation is reasonable, i.e., one which has a source outside of the Fourth
Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law
or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.""1
The majority indicated that the text of the Fourth Amendment suggests
that people are only protected in "their" houses., However, the Court has
held that in some situations a person can have a legitimate expectation of
privacy when he or she is a guest in the home of another. 3 In Minnesota v.
Olson," the Court found that the defendant's status as an overnight guest
82. Id. at 94.
83. Id. at 98.
84. Id. at 99.
85. Id.
86. Concurring with Justice Rehnquist were Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Breyer, with Justices
Ginsburg, Stevens and Souter dissenting. Carter,525 U.S. at 84.
87. Id.
88. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138 (1979). In Rakas, the petitioners were convicted of armed
robbery. At trial, evidence of a sawed-off rifle and rifle shells was introduced. Id. The police seized
these articles during a search of the petitioners' car. Id.Neither owned the car nor asserted that they
owned the rifle or shells taken by the officers. Id. The Appellate Court of Illinois held that the petitioners lacked standing and denied their motion to suppress the evidence. Id. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari-Id.at 129-30.

89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 131.
Id. at 138.
Id. at 142-43.
The Constitutional phrase is, "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

93. Carter,525 U.S. at 89.
94. 495 U.S. 91 (1990).
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was sufficient to show he had Fourth Amendment protection." In the instant case, the Court found that the respondents were obviously not overnight guests, they did not have a previous relationship with Thompson, and
the apartment was only a place for them to conduct business."
The Court reasoned that property used for commercial purposes is different than that of personal residential property." It stated, "an expectation
of privacy in commercial premises, however, is different from, and indeed
less than, a similar expectation in an individual's home."' The Court indicated that while the respondents were in a 'home,' it was not their home.The Court has found that in some cases a worker can claim ownership over
his own workspace, but in this situation, the respondents had no significant
connection with the apartment.' ® The Court went on to state that if an overnight guest typifies a person who can claim Fourth Amendment protection,
and a person merely "legitimately on the premises" typifies one who cannot,
then the Carter case was somewhere in between.10' The Court concluded
that the commercial nature of the transaction, the short time on the premises, and the lack of any previous connection with the homeowner made
2
Carter's and Johns' more like persons merely permitted on the premises.'
Therefore, the Court held that any search conducted did not violate their
Fourth Amendment rights.'10
While four justices concurred in the opinion, their interpretations differed. Justice Scalia, joined by Thomas, believed that the decision by the
Court accurately applied recent case law, including Olson.'5 ' He did not
focus on "a legitimate expectation of privacy," which he considered a fuzzy
standard, but looked at whether a search or seizure covered by the Fourth
Amendment had occurred.- Relying on history and a textual analysis of the
Fourth Amendment, Justice Scalia found that the respondents were not in
"their house," and therefore had no Fourth Amendment protection. '06
While Justice Kennedy agreed with the dissent that a guest has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a host's house, he found that Carter and
Johns established, "nothing more than a fleeting and insubstantial connec-

95. Id. at 96-97.
96. Carter,525 U.S. at 90.

97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 90-91 (Scalia, J. concurring).

101. Id.at 91.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 97. The text of the amendment states: "The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. CONST.
amend. IV (emphasis added).
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tion with Thompson's home."'"' As a result, they could not be considered
guests in Thompson's home and had no expectation of privacy in it.',, Justice Breyer focused on whether an "unreasonable search" had occurred.'He concluded that it had not, reasoning that Officer Thielen stood outside
the apartment's "curtilage" when he made his observations."0
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg stated that:
The Court's decision undermines not only the security of short-term
guests, but also the security of the home resident herself [sic]. In
my view, when a homeowner or lessor personally invites a guest
into her home to share in a common endeavor, whether it be for
conversation, to engage in leisure activities, or for business purposes licit or illicit, that guest should share his host's shelter against
unreasonable searches and seizures."'
Justice Ginsburg argued that individuals should be able to choose whom
they allow into their homes."' Guests should have the same expectation of
privacy as the host because they have been invited."' Justice Ginsburg reasoned that previous decisions by the Court indicated that people have reasonable expectations of privacy in their homes because of their ability to
Justice Ginsburg indicated that Fourth
consciously exclude others.'
Amendment decisions should reflect the prerogatives of being able to include and exclude people from one's home.' Justice Ginsburg's concern
was that the decision in Carter would tempt police to pry into private residences in order to find evidence that guests possess, knowing that the guest
would not be able to raise a Fourth Amendment claim."'
Justice Ginsburg contended that if an overnight guest had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the home of another, then the logic should extend
to short-term guests as well."' Justice Ginsburg concluded that:
In sum, when a homeowner chooses to share the privacy of her
home and her company with a short-term guest, the twofold re-

107. Id. at 102 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 104 (Breyer, J., concurring).
110. Id. For a discussion ofcurtilage, see United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 302 (1987), where the
Supreme Court held that a barn and the area around it was outside the protected curtilage of the suspect's
ranch so that the observation of the barn did not constitute a search of the curtilage in violation of the
Fourth Amendment.
111. Id. at 106 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Joining Justice Ginsburg were Justices Stevens and Souter.
112. Id, at 107.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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quirement 'emerging from prior decisions' has been satisfied: Both
host and guest 'have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy; that 'expectation [is] one [our] society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.""
Justice Ginsburg argued that the Court's obligation was to produce coherent results in Fourth Amendment cases, and the decision in the instant
case veered sharply from Katz."' Justice Ginsburg stated that when we enter the home of another to engage in a common endeavor, we should be
protected from warrantless searches.'20
ANALYSIS

The Court's application of the "reasonable expectation of privacy"
standard in Fourth Amendment cases has often been disturbing. It allows
the Court to narrow Fourth Amendment protections depending upon how it
chooses to apply the concepts of "reasonable" and "privacy. ":12 Reasonable,
while being objective, is a word with which principled analysis can be
avoided, and privacy is an amorphous concept that can be widely interpreted.'1 The reasonable expectation of privacy test articulated by Justice
Harlan in Katz is simple to remember, but difficult to apply.'213 In the criminal procedure context, reasonableness is a flexible standard but it is ambiguous, easy to manipulate, and can allow for inconsistent results.' 4 Many
scholars have concluded that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is a "mess,"
and that trying to uncover the confusing and unwieldly state of the search
and seizure doctrine is "fanciful.."'1 5 As one professor quipped, "all searches
2 6
and seizures must be grounded in probable cause, but not on Tuesdays.' 1
Under Katz, careful analysis is needed in determining when a visitor
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the home of another.'2- The home
is the most sacred area protected by the Fourth Amendment.' 2' It receives
this revered status not because it is a structure in which a person lives, but
because of society's expectation of its sanctity. Notably, the Court, while
recognizing the sanctity of the home and the privacy rights therein, has used

118. Id. at 109.
119.

120.
121.
(1999).
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

d. at 111.

Id.
Jones, supra note 38, at 914; Erik G. Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48 DUKE L.J. 787, 794
Luna, supra note
Jones, supra note
Luna, supra note
Id. at 799.
Id.
Jones, supra note
Id. at 957.
Id. at 957-58.

121, at 794; Jones, supra note 38, at 914.
38, at 914.
121, at 794.
38, at 958-59.
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the sovereignty of the home to both invalidate and uphold laws.'- This inconsistency seems even greater considering the Court's reverence for the
home. 3' It has often made statements such as the home is, "the last citadel
of the tired, the weary, and the sick."'32 The Court also stated that, "preserving the sanctity of the home, the one retreat to which men and women
can repair from the tribulations of their daily pursuits, is surely an important
value.""'3 When a guest is invited into a home, is in the presence of the host,
and is engaged in a common activity with the host, custom implies 3that the
guest has acquired a reasonable expectation of privacy in that home.' '
The holding in Minnesota v. Carter provides another example of the
Court's inconsistent application of the reasonable expectation of privacy
standard. While its decisions in the area of privacy expectations in the
home of another are few, it missed an opportunity in Carter to provide a
bright line rule for lower courts to follow.
Overnight Guest versus Short-Term Guest

Justice Rehnquist, writing the opinion of the Court, relied on Olson.'
In Olson, the Court held that the "status as an overnight guest is alone sufficient to show that he had an expectation of privacy in the home that society
is prepared to recognize as reasonable."'3 6 The decision in Olson is troubling because while it holds that an overnight guest has reasonable expectations of privacy in the home of another, it leaves open for interpretation
whether a short-term guest would have the same expectation.
The Carteropinion creates even more questions. If Carter and Johns
had been spending the night at the apartment, would they then have had an
automatic expectation of privacy? Under Olson they would, but should
they? How long does one have to know someone before they can be a leactivities in the
gitimate guest? At some point would Carter's and Johns'
37
apartment have become private rather than commercial?'
Had the majority truly applied the Katz test, the decision in Carter
would likely have been different. As in Katz, Carter and Johns conducted

130. Luna, supra note 121, at 799. While the following cases present First Amendment issues, they
illustrate the Court's inconsistency in viewing the home and the privacy contained therein. See City of
Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 58 (1994), where a municipal ordinance that prohibited homeowners from

displaying signs was invalidated. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 476-77 (1988), where an ordinance prohibiting picketing before a private home was upheld131. Id. at 854.
132. Frisby, 487 U.S. at484.
133. Id.
134. Dripps, supra note 24, at 86-87.

135. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91,93 (1990).
136. Id. at 96-97.
137. Hudson, supra note 55, at 29.
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illegal business and attempted to make their actions private.'3' They entered
Thompson's apartment and purposely closed the blinds. 9 Katz entered a
public phone booth to conduct his business and the Court concluded that,
"what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.",- The Court held that the government's activities in listening in and recording Katz's conversation violated
the privacy upon which he relied upon while using the phone."' The Court
held that an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment had occurred.' 2 Justice Stewart, writing the majority opinion in Katz, stated that,
"no less than an individual in a business office, in a friend's apartment, or in
a taxicab, a person in a telephone booth may rely upon the protection of the
Fourth Amendment.'"4
Certainly, when Carter and Johns made the effort to go inside the
apartment and close the blinds they were entitled to assume that their activities would be free from police observation. Based on Katz, Thielen's
peering in and observing Carter's and Johns' activities could easily have
been viewed by the Court as violating the privacy upon which they relied
while using the apartment. While it can be contended that Officer Thielen's
peering did not constitute a "search" because what a person knowingly exposes to the public is not protected by the Fourth Amendment, Carter and
Johns did not knowingly expose themselves to Officer Thielen.'" Officer
Thielen had to climb behind bushes, position himself close to the window,
and then had to look through a small hole in the blind to observe Carter's
and John's activities.14 The Court could easily have found that Carter and
Johns had a reasonable expectation of privacy in Thompson's apartment,
and that it was one that society would recognize as reasonable. Because
courts are reluctant to suppress valuable evidence, the Court's failing to find
an expectation of privacy in this case is not surprising.'"'
A Guest's Status Should Not Matter

The dissent correctly recognized that a guest should share his host's
shelter against unreasonable searches and seizures whether the guest is there
for conversation or commercial purposes. 4 7 Focusing on the unique importance of the home as the most essential bastion of privacy recognized by the

138. Carter, 525 U.S. at 85.

139. Id.
140. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
141. Id.at347.
142. Id.

143. Id.at 352.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id.at351.
Carter,525 U.S. at 85.
Perrin, supra note 20, at 674.
dissenting).
Carter,525 U.S. at 106 (Ginsburg, J.,
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law, Justice Ginsburg cited United States v. Karo.-8 In Karo the Court held
that, "private residences are places in which the individual normally expects
privacy free of governmental intrusion not authorized by a warrant."9 The
Justice also relied on Payton v. New York,'5 ° where the Court stated that,
"the Fourth Amendment protects the individual's privacy in a variety of
settings. In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when
bound by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual's home."''
Justice Ginsburg reasoned that if an overnight guest gains a reasonable expectation of privacy in a host's home, the logic of that decision should extend to shorter-term guests as well,'52 which it should.
Justice Ginsburg's position is that if a homeowner chooses to share the
privacy of her home with a guest, the expectation of privacy should also
extend to the guest because this association is valued.'" Finally, the Justice
voiced a valid concern that the majority did not consider. That is, the majority's decision could easily tempt police into prying into private residences without warrant in order to find incriminating evidence against the
guests. Because they are mere guests, they would not be able to raise
Fourth Amendment claims.'' For example, suppose a person is a suspected
criminal. All the police would have to do is wait until that person enters a
house or apartment where they know s/he does not live, being free at that
point to conduct a warrantless search. This situation is frightening. The
police would have everything to gain and nothing to lose by conducting
searches of private residences. In a society that values privacy, this is unacceptable.
Shortcomings of the CarterDecision
The majority's interpretation of the "reasonable expectation of privacy" standard fosters a fact-dependent analysis of Fourth Amendment issues, allowing for continued variations on the scope of Fourth Amendment
protection.'" Its decision adds confusion in clarifying Fourth Amendment
adjudication when visitors are in the home of another. As Justice Scalia
stated in his concurring opinion, "in my view, the only thing the past three
decades have established about the Katz test . ..is that, unsurprisingly,
those 'actual (subjective) expectation[s] of privacy' 'that society is prepared

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984).
Id.
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
Id.at 589.
Carter,525 U.S. at 109 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 108.
Hudson, supra note 55, at 29.
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to recognize as reasonable,' bear an uncanny resemblance to those expectations of privacy this Court considers reasonable."" 6
In applying the standard, a better question in determining the subjective expectation of privacy would be: Who possesses the residence, and
does that person intend to afford their guests the sanctity of their home and
the long established privacy right that goes with it? If yes, then the host and
his guest should have the right to exclude the government from unreasonable searches and seizures because both prongs of Katz would be met.
Further, the Carter opinion raises the question of what the police do
and do not know at the time of a search, and whether this knowledge should
ultimately affect whether seized evidence is admissible or inadmissible at
trial. The exclusionary rule is the remedy for Fourth Amendment violations.' 7 Any evidence gathered in violation of the amendment is excluded
from trial in order to discourage police misconduct."' It does not make
sense that the Court in Carter created rules that require the relationship
between the householder and guest to be post-examined. That is, rather
than determining later that the guest was not an overnight guest or that he
did not previously know the homeowner, it would be more appropriate to
look at what the officer knew of the relationship prior to the time of the
search. How could Officer Thielen have known that Carter and Johns were
not overnight guests when he observed them bagging the white powder?
Maybe they had spent the previous night in the apartment. Should Officer
Thielen's actions be excused and the evidence included by what the police
learned later-that they were not overnight guests, they did not know
Thompson, and they stayed only a short-time. Is this fair? While the Court
stated that it did not have to decide whether Officer Thielen's observations
constituted a search because Carter and Johns had no legitimate expectation
of privacy in Thompson's apartment,' 9 officer knowledge at the time of the
search is an important issue that needs to be addressed.

156. Carter,525 U.S. at 97 (Scalia, J. concurring).
157. Ed Aro, The Pretext Problem Revisited: A Doctrinal Exploration of Bad Faith in Search and
Seizure Cases, 70 B. U. L. REv. 111, 136-37 (1990).
158. Id. at 388. See L. Timothy Perrin, It is Broken: Breaking the Inertia ofthe Exclusionary Rule, 26
PEPP. L. REV. 971, 971 (1999). The exclusionary rule was originally created by the Supreme Court and

became applicable in state courts in 1961. See Aro, supra note 156, at 136-37. The objective of the rule
is to deter police misconduct by excluding evidence that the government acquires in violation of a defendant's constitutional rights. Because the exclusionary rule can allow guilty defendants to escape
punishment, it has received substantial criticism and federal courts have continually limited its scope. Id.

Narrowing of the rule, however, can lead to the diminution of peoples' rights and many scholars have
suggested alternative remedies for Fourth Amendment violations. Id. See Christopher Slobogin, Why
Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 99 ILL. L. REV. 363, 363 (1999). Professor Slobogin
suggests the remedy should be damages brought directly against police officers and departments, deter-

ring Fourth Amendment violations and encouraging the use of warrants. Id. See Alan Dalsass, Options:
An Alternative Perspective on Fourth Amendment Remedies, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 2297, 2297 (1998),
where a hybrid model using liquidated tort-type damages and the exclusionary rule was proposed to

achieve deterrence.
159. Carter,525 U.S. at 91.
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Implicationsfor State and Federal Courts

Unfortunately, the Carter decision does not help courts in making
Fourth Amendment decisions when others are invited into the homes of
another. The Court established no bright line rule. In fact, courts must
grapple with even more issues. When does an activity constitute a private
versus commercial undertaking? At what point does a guest have an actual
subjective expectation of privacy in the home of another? Until the Supreme Court is willing to set a firm course in this area, lower court decisions
will continue to be inconsistent.
Two recent cases illustrate this point. The facts were similar in each
case. The appellants were in the homes of friends when the police entered
and found them in possession of drugs. Both courts relied on Carter in
making their decisions but they came to opposite conclusions. In United
States v. Rodriguez,'" the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit interpreted the Supreme Court's holding in Carter to mean that ordinary social
or business guests do not have expectations of privacy in the homes of others.' Because Rodriquez was in a friend's apartment when police entered
and found him with methamphetamine, the court concluded that he had no
expectation of privacy there."2 Therefore, his Fourth Amendment rights
were not violated.16 The court affirmed Rodriguez's conviction.'"
In Morton v. United States, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
held that Morton did have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the home
of a friend even though he had no ownership interest in the residence and
did not live there.- Its analysis centered around Justice Kennedy's (the fifth
justice whose vote was decisive in Carter)concurring opinion.'" It stated,
"of key importance is that the majority opinion depended on the concurrence of Justice Kennedy, who joined the opinion expressly because "its
reasoning" was consistent with [his] view that almost all social guests have
a legitimate expectation, and hence protection against unreasonable searches
in their host's home."" Five justices agreed that guests have expectations
of privacy in a host's home.
In the instant case, Justice Kennedy said, "most, if not all, social guests
legitimately expect that, in accordance with social custom, the homeowner
will exercise her discretion to include or exclude others for the guest's bene-

160. No. 98-10075, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 3350, at *2(9th Cir. Feb. 26, 1999).
161. Id.

162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. 734 A.2d 178, 179 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

166. Id.
167. Id.
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fit." '" He went on to say that "in this respect, the dissent must be correct
that reasonable expectations of the owner are shared, to some extent, by the
guest... as a general rule, social guests will have an expectation of privacy
in their host's home.' °6 Justice Kennedy indicated that Carter and Johns
were not social guests because they had established nothing more than a
fleeting and insubstantial connection with Thompson's home and could not
claim an expectation of privacy there.' 70 The Court of Appeals found that
the opinion of Justice Kennedy had to be taken seriously." It concluded
that nothing in Justice Kennedy's opinion suggested that he would require
an Olson (overnight guest) showing for a defendant to claim Fourth
Amendment protection. The court stated, "our attempt to read the 'tea
leaves' of how the Supreme Court would decide this case must be guided by
72
that recognition.'
The court concluded that Morton's connection with his friend's house
was enough to show that he was more than "simply permitted on the prem1
ises."in
He had known his friend for ten years and had frequently visited his
house.'"1 The court found that unlike the situation in Carter,Morton had a
previous relationship with the householder-he had been to the house before. The fact that Morton entered the house directly after selling drugs, the
court felt, allowed for the conjecture of a "commercial" link but nothing
more.'' Interestingly, as in Carter, Morton had been in the householder's
premises an extremely short time-five minutes.' The court did not comment on this. In conclusion the court stated, "following the common thread
in the various opinions in Carterthat at least social guests of the host generally have a legitimate expectation of privacy, we hold that the appellant met
his burden of showing that he had a protectible [sic] interest in the house...

168. Carter,525 U.S. at 99 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
169. Id.
170. Id.

171. Morton v. United States, 734 A.2d 178, 182 (D.C. App. 1999). The court in Morton stated that
Kennedy's analysis, "suggested that, as a general rule, social guest will have an expectation of privacy in
their host's home." Id. at 181. The court felt that Kennedy only joined the majority in Carterbecause
their opinion was consistent with his view of social guests having expectations of privacy in the host's
home. Id. at 182. The four member minority would have concluded that Carter had an expectation of
privacy in Thompson's apartment because he was invited into it by the host and it would not matter how
long he stayed or what he did there. Id. The court in Morton thought it was key that the majority opinion in Carter depended on Kennedy's concurrence, who joined the opinion expressly because it was
consistent with his view of social guests. Id. Because Kennedy found Carter to be a non-guest, he
joined the majority opinion. id.
172. Id.

173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.

176. Id. at 179.
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the evidence obtained as a result of entry should have been suppressed."The court reversed Morton's conviction.'7'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit attempted to
draw a bright line result from Carter: The overnight guest has an expectation of privacy while the ordinary guest does not. The United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia focused on the elements of the decision, choosing to avoid altogether the short-term guest issue. These cases
demonstrate that decisions among the lower courts will continue to be inconsistent regarding guests and their ability to claim Fourth Amendment
violations. Carter was a poor test case for helping determine when people
have expectations of privacy when they are invited into the homes of others
because it creates more questions than it answers. The Court was illadvised to grant it certiorari.
CONCLUSION
The Fourth Amendment bans "unreasonable searches and seizures" by
police or the State to protect society's treasured value of privacy and its
need for security. Its interpretation depends upon the weight one gives to
the values it protects.' 7' Because protection is often asserted, as in the instant case, by those thought least worthy of it, the Court's application of the
"reasonable expectation of privacy" appears to be aimed at limiting their
0
rights, ultimately infringing on all peoples' rights." There is no question
that the government needs to gather evidence. However, all members of
society should be protected from the bane of unreasonable searches and
seizures when they are invited into the home of another. In Justice Louis
Brandeis's words, the Fourth Amendment, "conferred, against the government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the
most valued by civilized men."' The dissent is correct. Regardless of
whether we are overnight guests or not, we all-doctor, lawyer, tailor, cocaine bagger-have the right to be protected by the Fourth Amendment not
only in our own homes, but in those of others as well.
GAY GEORGE
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